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"The [W]ord has gone out.... If you want to stay in, stop taking
drugs." I
"In order to win the war against drugs, we must not sacrifice the life of
the Constitution in the battle."
'2
I. Introduction
In recent months, public attention has dramatically been drawn to
the dangers posed by substance abuse and drug dependence.
3
While much of the publicity has focused on educational programs
and efforts to halt the flow of narcotics to the United States, the role
of drug testing in the workplace has surfaced as a central theme of
the campaign against drug abuse. The effects of substance abuse on
the property rights of private employers and of drug testing on the
privacy rights of private employees have been discussed and de-
bated elsewhere. 4 However, the constitutional and policy problems
1. The Enemy Within, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 58, 71, col. 3 (statement ofJulian Bar-
ber, Pentagon health official).
2. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986).
3. See, e.g., President and Mrs. Reagan, remarks for a national television address on
drug abuse and prevention (Sept. 14, 1986) reprinted in OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY,
THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE. During the address, the President intoned, "Drugs
are menacing our society. They're threatening our values and undercutting our institu-
tions. They're killing our children." Id. at 1. The joint speech marked, in the words of
the first lady, the beginning of a "great new national crusade" against illegal narcotics.
Id. at 6. See also The Enemy Within, supra note 1.
4. Analysts have estimated that the property damage, absenteeism, lost productivity.
quality control programs, and higher health care costs engendered by substance abuse
cost American businesses tens of billions of dollars annually. Geidt, Drug and Alcohol
Abuse in the W1ork Place: Balancing Employer and Employee Rights, II EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 181
(1985). See generally Adams & Remmers, Drugs and Alcohol in the Workplace: Technology, Law'
and Policy, 2 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L.J. 305 (1986); SUBSTANCE ABUSE
IN THE WORKPLACE (D. Smith, D. Wesson, F. Zerkin &J. Novey eds. 1985). In the ab-
sence of state action or governmental interference, employee claims rely most heavily
upon state constitutional rights to privacy, common law protection against tortious inva-
sion of privacy, state and federal statutes recognizing chemical dependency as a handi-
cap, and, in the case of unionized labor, fair dealing and collective bargaining powers
under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Though the
NLRB has never ruled on drug testing, the Board has generally held that unilateral
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created by suspicionless drug testing of government employees
have become the subject of vigorous and unresolved arguments pit-
ting individual privacy rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment
against the fundamental government interest in public safety and
workplace discipline. 5 The randomness of government drug testing
arguably violates two basic tenets of the fourth amendment: the
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and the re-
quirement of a warrant supported by probable cause. Conversely,
the emphatic and immediate social interest in a drug-free environ-
ment militates for stringent measures to detect and eradicate sub-
stance abuse. This Current Topic argues that while the fourth
amendment does not act as a complete bar to non-cause drug test-
ing,6 it imposes a substantial evidentiary burden on the government
which can only be overcome in a few severely circumscribed situa-
tions. In all other cases, suspicionless government drug testing of
employees violates both constitutional prohibitions and social policy
objectives.
II. The Fourth Amendment Background
The vast majority of drug urinalysis cases7 involving government
employees have grappled with the issue in terms of the privacy
rights created by the search and seizure restrictions of the fourth
changes in work rules violate the mandatory bargaining requirement of the Act. See
Chemtronics, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 178, 191 (1978) (no-smoking policy held to be
mandatory subject of bargaining). These limitations are generally meager protection
against private employer power.
5. The debate over public-sector drug testing has been punctuated by a series of
attacks, both vitriolic and poignant. The image of George Orwell's Big Brother has
been consistently raised by skeptical civil libertarians. See Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F. Supp. at 1511; Planfor School Drug Testing Divides Texas Town, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30,
1986, at A16, col. 4 (" 'When I first heard about ... [the plan for mandatory drug testing
of all 6th through 12th graders in Beaumont district schools] ... I thought of that book
"1984".... I'm amazed how many people are so gung-ho for it' ") (quoting Wanda
Grimes, local PTA president). Conversely, the devastating impact of drug use has
pushed many observers to advocate an all-out battle despite the potential harm to per-
sonal freedoms. See The Enemy Within, supra note 1, at 59 ("the casualties may range from
a thug in Miami to the dearest of civil liberties.... Yet the war is urgent and necessary.
Suddenly the whole system feels poisoned by a world in which millions of one's country-
men eagerly dream themselves to death.").
6. Random and non-cause are herein used interchangeably to denote searches lack-
ing any individualized basis for suspicion. While random searches differ in some degree
from mandatory or suspicionless testing, they raise essentially equivalent constitutional
questions. These investigatory methods are compared with searches based upon differ-
ing levels of individualized evidence, e.g., reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
7. While other methods of drug testing exist, most notably blood analysis, urinalysis
programs are far and away the most frequently used means of detecting employee drug




amendment." This provision prohibits the government from con-
ducting unreasonable searches and seizures. 9 The Supreme Court,
however, has never set out a comprehensive analysis of the amend-
ment.' 0 Prior to 1967, judicial interpretation of the search and
seizure clause demarcated certain constitutionally protected zones;
absent a warrant based upon probable cause, the government could
not physically breach these areas of privacy.1 ' The Supreme Court
periodically elaborated upon the definition of the textually com-
pelled zones, in cases dealing with bodies, 12 individual attire, 13
apartments, 14 personal letters, 15 and automobiles. 1 6 This method
of analysis provided a clear guide for law enforcement officials, but
8. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141-43 (3d Cir. 1986); Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1029 (1976); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474-77 (D.C. Cir.
1975); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, No. 86-353 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 2,
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, No. 86-3522 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Lovvorn
v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 879-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500
(D.D.C. 1986); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130-31 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 746
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488-92 (N.D. Ga.
1985); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 80-83 (C.M.A. 1983); Patchogue-Medford Con-
gress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1986);
Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup.Ct. 1986); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police,
500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
9. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The fourth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion ... which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment ... is ... enforcea-
ble against the States"). The amendment acts solely as a check upon sovereign author-
ity. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
10. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974)
(detailing barriers to comprehensive analysis of fourth amendment).
11. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
12. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
13. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
14. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
15. ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
16. Preston v. United' States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). On the other hand, the textual
prohibition against government intrusion on persons, houses, papers, and effects did
not extend to either open fields or telephone lines. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). The rationale of the Obnstead
and Hester protected zones theory was eloquently summed up in United States v. On
Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("A sane, decent, civilized
society must provide some oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated en-
closure, some inviolate place which is a man's castle"), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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as constitutional theory, it often proved inflexible and unfair. 17
Consequently, in Katz v. United States, 18 the Warren Court firmly re-
jected the doctrine of constitutionally protected zones:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. '9
Justice Harlan, in his famous concurrence, formulated a two-step
reasonableness standard resting on both an actual, subjective expec-
tation of privacy and a social recognition of a reasonable right to
privacy. 20 The shift from a zone test to a reasonableness standard
changed the judicial role from the application of constitutionally
mandated definitions to the sifting of social and individual
expectations.
The abandonment of the zone test evoked a related development
in fourth amendment jurisprudence. Historically, the search and
seizure safeguards required the police or other government agen-
cies to obtain a search warrant based upon probable cause. 2 1 Begin-
ning with the stop-and-frisk doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 22 however, the
Supreme Court gradually chipped away at the basic evidentiary re-
quirement, 23 articulating instead a test weighing the nature and rea-
17. See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amend-
ment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968 (1968); see also W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.2 (1984).
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. 389 U.S. at 351.
20. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's formulation has gradually
emerged as the definitive interpretation of Katz.
21. See 389 U.S. at 355.
22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry articulated a doctrine that suggested that relatively
unintrusive searches require less justification than probable cause. This analysis could
support a general fourth amendment theory that would simply weigh the measure of
intrusiveness against the public interest in the search. While this doctrinal approach
never has received full recognition, it implicitly underpins modern developments in
fourth amendment jurisprudence.
23. The general rule remains, albeit shakily, that searches without warrants sup-
ported by probable cause areperse unreasonable. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977). However, the exceptions to the rule have been considerably broadened over the
last two decades. These exceptions include: (1) border searches for contraband and
illegal aliens, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); (2) hot pursuit of
armed criminal suspects, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (3) airport searches
for weapons, United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); (4) entrance searches
at courthouses, Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972); (5) searches based
upon consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); (6) regulatory inspec-





sonableness of the circumstances.2 4 This development has paved
the way for the legitimization of non-cause searches 25 and the po-
tential validation of random government drug testing of its
employees.
III. Drug Testing.- The Judicial Reaction
Judicial analysis of drug use detection programs evolves within
this new framework. Although the relative dearth of appellate deci-
sions makes generalizing difficult, the recent spate of trial court
opinions strikes some common themes. Several opinions upheld
testing programs based not on random investigation but on reason-
able suspicion.26 In Allen v. City of Marietta, plaintiffs, employees of
the Marietta Board of Lights and Water, claimed that defendant's
drug testing program violated their fourth amendment rights. In
holding the urinalysis testing constitutional, the court noted three
influential factors: all tested employees were engaged in hazardous
operations, the city established a clear link between drug use and
actual injury, and - most significantly - the tests were conducted
pursuant to individualized and reasonable suspicion. 27 In a similar
24. Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985). Justice Blackmun recently decried the
"Court's implication that the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception." New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 749 (1985) (Blackmun,J., concurring). See also Current
Topic, New Jersey v. TL.O.: Misapplication of an Appropriate Standard, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 141 (1986). Despite Justice Blackmun's protestations, the federal courts continue
to broaden the scope of the fourth amendment balancing test. Random road blocks for
drunk drivers serve as one recent example ofjudicial balancing. In Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court overturned a Driving Under the Influence
(DUI) conviction on the basis of a fourth amendment analysis. The Court advocated a
fourth amendment construction designed "to safeguard the privacy and security of indi-
viduals against arbitrary invasions ..... Id. at 654, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). However, the Court concluded that such random searches
could be upheld if a minimal intrusion was balanced by a significant government interest
and no comparable method of obtaining the public goal existed. More recently, several
state courts have upheld local roadblocks under the Prouse standard. State v. Garcia, 481
N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), reh'g denied, 489 N.E.2d 168 (1986); Little v. State, 479
A.2d 903 (Md. 1984). See generally Note, Exploring the Constitutional Limits of Suspicionless
Searches: The Use of Roadblocks to Apprehend Drunken Drivers, 71 IOWA L. REV. 577 (1986)
(suggesting that visual observation of motorists is an adequate substitute for random
road blocks).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v.
Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (1973).
26. See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir. 1976); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Reasonable
suspicion is defined in terms of a quantum of individualized evidence somewhere on a
graded scale between complete randomness and probable cause. Significantly, reason-
able suspicion requires some objective factors in place of mere inarticulate hunches. See
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
27. In Allen, an informer smoked marijuana with employees during work hours. Al-
len v. City of Marietta, 601 F.Supp. at 484.
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case, the Seventh Circuit denied injunctive relief from a Chicago
Transit Authority rule requiring drug and alcohol testing of bus
drivers after a serious accident or other suspicious activity.28 The
court found dispositive the basing of the warrantless searches on
both individualized evidence and society's compelling interest in the
alertness of public bus drivers. 29 Lastly, in Turner v. Fraternal Order of
Police,30 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held constitu-
tional an agency policy of testing police and firefighters upon any
suspicion. The court found that because drug use decreased alert-
ness and impeded quick and decisive action, the preservation of
public safety necessitated urinalysis testing. However, the court ex-
pressly read the District of Columbia's regulation to allow testing
only on reasonable and objective factors, thereby reducing the risk
of intrusion on the privacy rights of innocent employees.
3 1
These three cases serve as part of a new core of drug testing law:
in government employment situations directly affecting public
safety, drug testing may be based on a quantum of individualized
evidence which is less than would meet the constitutional standard
of probable cause. 32 This relaxation of evidentiary requirements,
however, is not a significant departure from settled search and
seizure doctrine. Indeed, Allen, Suscy, and Turner merely elaborate
on the analysis first promulgated in Terry v. Ohio. 33 Terry permitted,
in certain cases involving a vital state interest, minimally intrusive
searches based on evidence less compelling than probable cause.
34
These drug testing cases suggest that an urinalysis required on the
basis of reasonable suspicion can be accurately perceived as a Terry
stop, a quasi-search requiring less than full constitutional protec-
tions. This view is patently correct. From the reassessment begun
in Terry flowed the notion that limited intrusions into fourth
amendment privacy rights require a parallel limited justification.
28. See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267.
29. Id. at 1267.
30. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
31. Id. at 1008.
32. But see Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1509 (D.D.C. 1986) (approving
only investigations predicated upon the higher evidentiary standard of probable cause).
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Ter,, a Cleveland police detective spotted two men appar-
ently 'casing' a store. Lacking probable cause, the officer nevertheless detained the sus-
pects and frisked their outer clothing for weapons. The Supreme Court held that the
search amounted to only a minor inconvenience and petty indignity. The majority up-
held the police action, stressing the relative social significance of the search and the
minimal individual intrusion.
34. While the level of intrusion of drug testing varies depending on the procedure,
urinalysis testing generally engenders less humiliation and dislocation than body




Drug testing of government employees that is predicated upon rea-
sonable suspicion falls under this doctrine. Consequently, the real
difficulty lies in determining under what circumstances - if any -
the government can institute suspicionless tests, which are signifi-
cantly more likely to infringe upon constitutional rights of
individuals.3
5
Major cases dealing with drug testing have wrestled with this
question. With only one or two major exceptions, 36 the federal
courts have consistently struck down random government testing of
employees. However, the varying fact patterns of these cases have
hindered comprehensive resolution of the constitutional issues.
Despite the distinguishing characteristics of these cases, certain
analytical patterns emerge from these decisions; the federal courts
have repeatedly insisted upon the dual application of due process
requirements and of a reasonableness test drawing a rational nexus
between the government program and social safety interests. In Mc-
Donell v. Hunter,37 for example, officials of the Iowa prison system,
concerned with the smuggling of drugs to prisoners, instituted both
a body search and a drug testing program for correctional facility
officers. Even though as a practical matter employees were required
to submit to testing only on articulable grounds, the district court
faulted the prison system for the arbitrary and capricious failure to
establish standards, give written notice, and provide clear testing
guidelines.38 The absence of these measures severely undermined
the state's argument that the prison employees retained reduced
subjective expectations of privacy. 39 More significantly, the court
35. While law enforcement agencies may predicate testing on reasonable suspicion,
this finding does not moot the question of whether the workplace serves as an appropri-
ate setting for drug testing. Instead, it merely raises further issues of employment link-
ages and alternative solutions. See infra § IV.
36. See, e.g., Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Callaway upheld random drug testing of military personnel. The compelling public in-
terest in the readiness of the armed forces and the reduced expectation of individual
privacy would have justified a decision allowing random investigation. However, the
court's opinion was expressly based upon the unique spartan rigors of military life. "To
strike the proper balance between legitimate military needs and individual liberties we
must inquire whether 'conditions peculiar to military life' dictate affording different
treatment to activity arising in a military context." Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway,
518 F.2d at 476, quoting Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Indeed, a recent decision refused to extend Callawav to civilian security officers em-
ployed at Fort Stewart, Georgia. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger,
No. 86-353 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
37. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
38. Id. at 1126. See also Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (faulting
OSHA for permitting unbridled discretion in the formulation of regulatory inspections).
39. Several courts have suggested that the method of drug testing may affect the
level of intrusion. Failure to give notice, herding together of employees in a dehumaniz-
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chastised the defendants for their failure to establish a rational
nexus between the urinalysis and the goals of the program. "The
possibility of discovering who might be using drugs and therefore
might be more likely than others to smuggle drugs to prisoners is
too far attenuated to make seizures of bodily fluids constitutionally
reasonable." 40 In imposing a nexus requirement, the court implied
that the government, in instituting a drug testing program, carries
the burden of showing the existence of a causal relationship be-
tween suspicionless investigations and government goals. This re-
quirement has created enormous evidentiary difficulties for
proponents of non-cause intrusions.
4 1
The district court's analysis in Jones v. McKenzie 42 closely tracks the
pattern of McDonell. Amid reports of increased traffic accidents,
growing absenteeism, and erratic employee behavior, the District of
Columbia School Board initiated mandatory testing of all Transpor-
tation Section employees. Herded into a large room, the plaintiff
and her colleagues were tested under an unconfirmed EMIT proce-
dure.43 Judge Oberdorfer, rejecting the school board's position, re-
buked the government for both procedural laxness and the failure
to harmonize the testing program with investigative goals. Because
the testing encompassed all employees, not just drivers and
mechanics, 44 the board could not establish a rational relationship
between the scope of the investigation and the social safety goals;
overbroad testing increased the chances of intrusion on privacy
rights without substantially adding to public security.
Following the trail blazed by Jones and McDonell, the court in Capua
v. City of Plainfield struck down mandatory testing of all local police
ing manner, lack of confidentiality, and public observation of the private act of urination
all add to the humiliation and degradation of the process. Conversely, effective proce-
dural safeguards can minimize both employee expectations of privacy and employer ar-
bitrariness. See, e.g., Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(suggesting that while random testing of prisoners was otherwise acceptable, the addi-
tional humiliation of public performance, when not compelled by any security or accu-
racy requirements, rendered such testing impermissible). See also City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (repeating the trial court's assertion
that random or mandatory testing as part of a yearly physical decreases the subjective
and objective intrusion into privacy and daily life).
40. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
41. See infra § IV.
42. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
43. For a description of the EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique)
test, see infra note 90.
44. For example, plaintiffJuanita Jones served as a school bus monitor; the defend-





and firefighters. 45 Pointing out that no historic evidence supported
the city's tale of public danger, Judge Sarokin chided the defendants
for their failure to implement the safeguards of due process: ade-
quate notice, minimum intrusion, and appropriate confidentiality
standards. The court focused on several procedural failings, includ-
ing the publicity surrounding the program, the highly intrusive na-
ture of body surveillance, and the Fire Department's tactics of
surprise and deception. 46 In addition, the same overbreadth prob-
lem that plagued the Jones program undermined the Plainfield pro-
cedures. Among those dismissed was a city communications officer
whose position was not directly related to public safety. In sum,
these cases demonstrate a consistent judicial concern that drug test-
ing programs meet the twin requirements of the Katz standard: fair
process to minimize the subjective expectation of privacy, and a re-
lational nexus between specific government intrusions and the pro-
tection of important social interests.
Only one recent case bucks this trend. The holding of that case,
Shoemaker v. Handel,47 rests on distinguishing factual characteristics:
the availability of notice, adequate procedural safeguards, and in-
sured confidentiality. 48 In Shoemaker, several prominent jockeys
challenged a policy of random testing administered by the New
Jersey Racing Commission. The Third Circuit, affirming the district
court's validation of the policy, pointed both to the procedural ele-
ments of confidentiality and to the highly circumscribed nature of
the testing; no trainers, grooms, or track officials were needlessly
tested.49 Nevertheless, the grounds for affirmance appear inconsis-
tent with the protection of privacy rights and social norms. While
the safeguards of the program were surely admirable, these proce-
dures alone could not satisfy the test of reasonableness. Conse-
quently, the Third Circuit rooted its holding in the history of
45. 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1522 (D.NJ. 1986).
46. On May 26, 1986, all firefighters and fire officers were ordered to submit to
urinalysis testing. At 7:00 A.M. on May 26, the Plainfield Fire Chief and the Director of
Public Affairs and Safety entered the fire station, locked all doors, and awakened the
slumbering employees. Each firefighter was ordered to submit an urine sample pro-
duced under the watchful eyes of bonded testing agents. This procedure was repeated
twice over the following two weeks. Id. at 1511.
47. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
48. The Third Circuit correctly suggested that the right to privacy in medical infor-
mation may be undercut by a compelling state interest. However, any access to medical
records is severely circumscribed by need and confidentiality. See Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir.
1980).
49. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d at 1143-44.
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administrative regulation and the intense public interest in race
course safety. Both bases are problematic.
First, the Shoemaker court suggested that the history of regulation
substantially reduced the jockeys' reasonable expectation of privacy.
While regulation of race betting standards may have been pervasive,
nothing in the state's history of regulation anticipated suspicionless
drug testing of jockeys. The Third Circuit pointed to some past
testing, but the argument that postrace testing of horses created an
expectation of similar invasion of human privacy seems ludicrous.
5 0
Such regulation could not reduce the jockeys' subjective expectation
of privacy. 5' Second, the court failed to establish a nexus between
drug use and safety. Assuming that drugs may impair motor coordi-
nation and pose a danger in a fast-paced sport, the state, at trial, was
unable to point to any actual incidents of injury due to drug or alco-
hol abuse.5 2 Administrative law on non-cause searches suggests
that random testing is impermissible if a less intrusive remedy ex-
ists; 53 constitutional norms require the use of the least intrusive
remedy. In Shoemaker, self-policing and self-education of jockeys
with respect to the dangers of riding and substance abuse served as
adequate substitutes for drug testing. In the absence of a break-
down of this system, the compelling state interest justifying inter-
vention appears strikingly weak.
The implications of these few cases may be easily summarized.
Suspicionless drug testing is permissible under certain severely lim-
50. Id. at 1138.
51. While the issue of subjective expectations often acts as a barrier to state action,
the controlling inquiry generally remains a social rather than an individual judgment of
the reasonableness of a privacy interest. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7
(1984); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 563 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Professor Am-
sterdam), "[A subjective expectation of privacy] can neither add to, nor its absence de-
tract from, an individual's claim to Fourth Amendment protection." Amsterdam, supra
note 10, at 384. While reduced expectations alone cannot justify government intrusion,
Amsterdam's view neglects the cohesive nature of the two-part Katz analysis. Adequate
notice or appropriate procedures alone may never justify government intrusion, but the
absence of acceptable standards diminishes a state's claim of reasonableness. These
procedural aspects clearly have a greater impact on individual than on social expecta-
tions. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.NJ. 1986).
52. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.NJ. 1986), afftd, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir. 1986).
53. See Camara v. Municipal Courts, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). Cf Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983) (articulating doctrine of requiring least intrusive alterna-
tive in the criminal sphere). The Shoemaker court's reliance on the entire body of admin-
istrative search case law seems somewhat misplaced. The greater latitude to conduct
warrantless searches of businesses reflects the lesser expectation of privacy in commer-
cial than in individual property. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981); Id.,





ited circumstances. First, to minimize disruption of individual ex-
pectations, drug testing must follow adequate notice, and must be
carried out confidentially and in accordance with written, published
procedures. Second, a nexus test sets the parameters mandated by
the second prong of Katz: the social utility of drug testing only out-
weighs the individual intrusion under circumstances clearly mani-
festing an important and overarching public interest, proven causal
links between each testing category, and improved agency function-
ing stemming from decreased narcotics use. However, courts have
only begun to define applicable standards. The next section exam-
ines several hurdles that government agencies face in meeting this
nexus requirement.
IV. The Nexus Test and the Limited Utility of Urinalysis Data
In theory, the value of drug testing lies in its ability to ensure the
safety and security of the public. More clearly, the basis for random
testing rests upon a widely held and superficially reasonable belief
that the use of controlled substances in the workplace poses a signif-
icant threat to the public. This supposed causal relationship be-
tween drug use and employment dysfunction is the condition
precedent for any non-cause intrusion into government employees'
fourth amendment rights. While the connection between testing
and safety is often accepted without much debate, it is open to sev-
eral lines of attack. First, the mechanics of drug testing are often
inaccurate, suggesting that indications of drug use cannot be linked
reliably with employment dysfunction and public safety. Second, a
positive result on an urinalysis sample does not by itself constitute
dispositive evidence that drug use impairs on-the-job employee per-
formance. Third, the often unquestioned assumption that drug use
in the workplace creates hazards is largely supported only by intui-
tion, and not by relevant empirical data. Consequently, drug testing
often proves ineffective in enforcing social norms and, indeed, is
often unnecessary given the efficacy of self-policing and self-help
policies.
The mechanics of drug testing procedures are frequently attacked
as imprecise. The prevalence of false positives and false negatives
has undermined the reputation of urinalysis programs. 54 While
much doubt has been raised about the reliability of the EMIT proce-
54. See Altman, Drug Tests Gain Precision, But Can Be Inaccurate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16,
1986, at A17, col. 1.
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dure,55 confirmation with gas chromatography plus mass spectrom-
etry (GS/MS), while expensive, is widely considered to be
authoritatively accurate. 56 However, the less publicized problem of
laboratory quality control may even surpass the reliability issues in
significance. The tedium and complexity of processing thousands of
roughly identical urine specimens creates enormous opportunities
for human error. In the spring of 1985, investigators for the Cen-
ters for Disease Control in Atlanta reported a crisis not in drug use
but in drug testing. A random survey of thirteen commercial labo-
ratories revealed grossly defective procedures. 57 These findings
mirror results of earlier studies. 58 The combination of inaccurate
tests and deficient testing raises severe credibility problems for sus-
picionless searches.
Second, drug traces linger in the blood stream long after behav-
ioral effects have disappeared. Unlike alcohol, THC metabolites
produce enzymes that can be detected for three days at a mini-
mum. 59 An employee consuming illicit narcotics on a Friday eve-
ning may test positive on Monday morning despite the absence of
any continuing influence. While some recent studies suggest that
impairment of complex cognitive and behavioral functions may last
longer than commonly supposed, 60 it is clear that drug traces out-
last narcotic effect. Thus, positive reaction to a drug test may have
55. For a further description of the EMIT test, see infra note 90. The EMIT method
is very sensitive and rarely produces false negatives; studies do confirm an approxi-
mately 10% false-positive rate. See Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening for Misused
Drugs, 16(4)J. OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 305, 312 (1984); Oellerich, Kulpman & Haeckel,
Drug Screening by Enzyme Immunoassay (EMIT) and Thin-Layer Chromatography (Drug Skreen),
15 J. OF CLINICAL CHEMISTRY AND CLINICAL BIOCHEMISTRY 275 (1977).
56. The failure to confirm test results constitutes a denial of due process. Both the
Army and Navy testing programs experienced numerous problems from confirmation
failure. The use of the same test for both confirmation and finding and the employment
of multiple unreliable tests created a significant error rate. Indeed, thousands of posi-
tive reports were erased from military records due to inconclusive testing procedures.
See Morgan, supra note 55, at 313.
57. See Altman, supra note 54, at A 17. The study found acceptable reporting in I of
11 labs testing for barbiturates, 0 of 12 for amphetamines, 6 of 12 for methadone, 1 of
11 for cocaine, 2 of 13 for codeine, and 1 of 13 for morphine. See also Hanson, Caudill &
Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, Results in CDC Blind Study, J. A.M.A. 2382 (1985). But see
Adams & Remmers, supra note 4, at 330 n.102 (1986) (arguing that findings of the study
could not be reasonably applied to well-funded private testing facilities).
58. See, e.g., Lundberg, Urine Drug Screening: Chemical McCarthyism, 287 NEw ENG.J. OF
MED. 723 (1972).
59. See Cohen, Drugs in the Workplace, 45 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 4, 5 (1984). THC is
tetrahydrocannabinol, the psychoactive component of marijuana.
60. See Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hollister, Carry-Over Effects of Marijuana Intoxication
on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A Preliminar, Report, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1325 (1985) (studying




no bearing on employment dysfunction. 6 1 Consequently, the nexus
between drug use, employment disability, and public safety may not
exist even with an accurate urinalysis.
62
Third, it is not altogether clear that drug use impairs work func-
tioning. Some researchers have contended that there is no proven
correlation between drug abuse and observed employment behav-
ior.6 3 Basing their argument on medical investigations, these ana-
lysts conclude that "urine screening is a probe to identify deviance,
not dysfunction - a technique to investigate humans, not acci-
dents." 64 While the point may be overstated - drug use appears to
have at least a short-term deleterious effect on motor coordination
and judgment65 - the conclusion is nonetheless instructive. Rele-
vant empirical data often leave unsupported the basic assumptions
made by administrators and courts about employment dysfunction
and narcotics use. The burden of proof must necessarily lie with the
government where any diminution of constitutional rights is in-
volved; consequently, the difficulties of demonstrating an adequate
link between drug use and public safety require the limitation of
random urinalysis testing to the few circumstances where it can be
justified by a compelling safety interest.
Finally, many testing programs are predicated only on the theo-
retical potential for harm stemming from drug use among employ-
ees, rather than on any demonstrable damage. 66 This justification
for random searches flows from an assumption that only non-cause
intrusions can effectively ensure universal compliance with impor-
tant social norms. 67 However, the social cost of suspicionless inva-
61. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986). Of course, this factor
may have less relevance to public employees such as military and medical personnel,
who are on essentially permanent call.
62. While the government retains an interest in the control of illegal activities, the
workplace is certainly not the appropriate forum for elaborate criminal investigations.
Legal and social norms militate against disadvantaging government employees under
the criminal law. See United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(dictum), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973); rev'dper ctriam, 415 U.S.
239 (1974). Job-related crime can be most effectively and fairly handled by normal in-
vestigative procedures designed to minimize the intrusion on innocent coworkers.
63. See Morgan, supra note 55, at 306. The Morgan study cites reports that suggest
drug use under some circumstances may enhance productivity. See Helms, Cocaine: Some
Observations on its History, Legal Classifications and Pharmacology, 4 CONTEMP. DRUG
PROBLEMS 175 (1975) (citing increased productivity among ancient Peruvian miners);
RUBIN & CoMITAs, GANJA IN JAMAICA: A MEDICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF
CHRONIC MARIJUANA USE (1975) (studying the beneficial effects of marijuana use on
modern Jamaican workers).
64. Morgan, supra note 55, at 306.
65. See Cohen, supra note 59, at 4.
66. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
67. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967).
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sions of the privacy of citizens subtracts from the value of public
programs; non-random procedures that realize the same gain and
prevent the same harm as suspicionless testing are legally and so-
cially preferable. Consequently, non-cause searches are only justifi-
able in situations evidencing a lack of potential substitutes. 68 This is
seldom the case with drug testing, for two reasons. First, policies
that are less intrusive than urinalysis programs, such as educational
and rehabilitative projects, or other means of employee self-help,
are often successful. 69 Second, employer investigations often un-
cover reasonable suspicion without ever raising fourth amendment
issues. 70 Visual inspection may reveal the damaging effects of drug
use; this type of search minimizes the need for more intrusive ran-
dom searches. 7 1 The long-term relationship created by government
employment vitiates the necessity for quick-fix solutions and distin-
guishes the drug testing issue from the patchwork searches unavoid-
ably applied at borders and airports. Indeed, curtailment of
suspicionless testing hardly deprives the employer of all weapons in
the fight against drugs, but merely forces the use of equally effective
but less intrusive methods.
In sum, by ignoring the success of self-policing efforts and the
potential effectiveness of non-intrusive educational or investigative
programs, government agencies have subverted constitutional
norms to gain little or nothing in the coinage of public safety. Basic
liberties cannot be sacrificed at the altar of attenuated and marginal
risks. Given the absence of any compelling interest in minimizing
an existing danger to society, the fourth amendment balance inevi-
68. See Camara at 534-39 (provisions of housing code could only be credibly enforced
through physical inspections of premises); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1970)
("Given the alternative mechanisms available, both those in use and those that might be
adopted, we are unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety of the
random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment"; e.g., visual en-
forcement of traffic rules achieves safety goals without unnecessary intrusion).
69. Indeed, benign neglect may be just as effective as other forms of social control.
In some areas, peer pressure among employees may provide adequate safeguards
against drug use in the workplace. See New Law to Combat Drugs: Wl'ords, Deeds and Political
Expediency, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A18, col. 2 (citing a growing consensus among
drug law-enforcement officials that education - and not other more heavily-funded pro-
grams - is the most effective means of fighting drug abuse. However, congressional
and bureaucratic politics often militate for projects more amenable to splashy media
coverage).
70. See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 484 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
71. See generally Adams & Remmers, supra note 4, at 339 (analyzing the pros and cons




tably tilts towards individual liberties.72 Constitutional testing pro-
grams may only be instituted in situations where the present and
precise risks posed by employee drug use are clearly spelled out.
V. Turning the Tables: Government Defenses Against Privacy Claims
Although social and legal factors militate against widespread ac-
ceptance of suspicionless drug testing, the courts will nonetheless
over the next few years be inundated by government employee suits
challenging such testing. Existing cases follow predictable patterns,
but public agencies will in the future certainly raise new and credible
defenses against fourth amendment claims. Many potential de-
fenses find credence in existing case law and social policy; however,
while the courts will have to elaborate on such matters as the re-
quirements of ajusticiable search and the role of consent in an em-
ployment relationship, for reasons enumerated below, the basic
balance of the fourth amendment test will remain unaltered.
A. The Search Requirement
Part of the debate over drug testing swirls around the issue of
whether an urinalysis actually constitutes a search within the scope
of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court has defined a search
as an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy, 73 and a
seizure as a meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in property.74 Most courts have dealt summarily with the
question, simply assuming that a drug test constitutes a justiciable
search 75 or, in one case, a seizure. 76 Only a solitary concurrence in
72. See generally Note, Individualized Suspicion in Factory Searches - The "Least Intrusive
Alternative", 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 403 (1984) (discussing constitutional requirement of
least intrusive strategy).
73. United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 739-741 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967)
74. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stewart,J., concurring). Tradition-
ally, this element of the fourth amendment applied to the taking of property or, alterna-
tively, to the infringement of the freedom of movement. See Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 696 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam).
75. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986) (supporting the
proposition that employee drug tests fall within the jurisdictional reach of the search
and seizure clause); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Mc-
Donell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Allen v. City of Marietta,
601 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (taking fingernail scrapings consti-
tutes a search under fourth amendment); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(blood tests violate reasonable expectation of privacy); Burnett v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Alaska 1986) (breathalyzer testing of suspected drunk
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Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police has seriously suggested that random
urinalysis testing fails to raise constitutional issues. 77
Despite the relative isolation of that single opinion, the argument
that drug testing falls outside the scope of the fourth amendment
appears well grounded in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. 7
Two recent cases lend support to this position. In United States v.
Place, 79 the Drug Enforcement Agency conducted a sniff test of lug-
gage, using dogs trained to detect the presence of illegal narcotics.
While the case was ultimately decided on other grounds,80 dicta in
the majority opinion suggested that the sniff test raised no cogniza-
ble privacy or property interest. The Court reasoned that no legiti-
mate possessory right could be found in the single issue of the
presence or absence of drugs or other contraband items. 8' This
analysis was more fully developed in United States v. Jacobsen.82 In
Jacobsen, employees of Federal Express searched an unclaimed pack-
age; they found - inside carefully wrapped tubing - a suspicious
white powder.83 FBI agents, summoned to the scene, conducted
without a search warrant a field test of the exposed substance. Not
surprisingly, the test proved positive and the cocaine was confis-
cated. The majority concluded that the field test did not itself con-
drivers raises fourth amendment issues). But see State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980)
(results of breathalyzer test admissible as reasonable search and seizure); Davis v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417 (D.C. 1968) (urine specimen admissible as voluntarily
given). But cf. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting analyses do not
fall within purview of fourth amendment); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)
(taking voice exemplars does not violate any reasonable expectations of privacy).
76. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. at 1127. While no one would suggest that
a person possesses a continuing property interest in disposed bodily fluids, the .cDonell
court argued that an urinalysis test interferes with private physiological data. However,
a properly processed test may not necessarily generate extraneous information.
77. 500 A.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J., concurring) ("[W]e must first
consider whether a police officer holds a subjective expectation of privacy in his body
waste .... An individual cannot retain a privacy interest in a waste product that, once
released, is flushed down the drain."). See also Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage,
634 F. Supp. at 1035.
78. Judge Nebeker's concurrence in Turner apparently did not rely on recent devel-
opments in the law but rather on more intuitive assumptions about the proper function-
ing of the fourth amendment and the sewage system.
79. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
80. The sniff test was struck down on the grounds that the detention of the luggage
constituted an unreasonable seizure of property. Id. at 710.
81. Id. at 707. Justice O'Connor asserted, rather unconvincingly, that the opinion of
the Court was severely limited; the sniff test was sui generis. In Jacobsen, Justice Brennan
faulted both the Court's imagination and knowledge in asserting that the sniff test was
unique. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. 466 U.S. at 109.
83. The search by the Federal Express employees fell under the category of private
search and, consequently, slid outside the scope of the fourth amendment. See, e.g.. Bur-
deau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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stitute a search; because the drug analysis could only reveal the
presence or absence of a controlled substance,8 4 the actions of the
FBI could not, according to the Court, "compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy." 85 Although the majority eventually waffled in
its reasoning, 6 the implications emerged clearly: investigational
procedures that only reveal the existence of illegal actions fall
outside the scope of the fourth amendment.
Justice Brennan, in a blistering dissent, attacked the logic of the
majority opinion.8 7 Arguing that the Court foreclosed any consider-
ation of the circumstances, Brennan charged that the decision "may
very well have paved the way for technology to override the limits of
law." 8 8 Furthermore, Justice Brennan argued that the fundamental
nature of the fourth amendment dictated a position contrary to the
majority's view. According to Brennan, Katz and its progeny stand
for the distinct proposition that reasonable expectations of privacy
in personal effects and information - rather than enumerated areas
- create an impenetrable zone that the police cannot violate absent
probable cause. 89
84. These supposedly exact tests are often flawed. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp.
1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), modified, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022
(1981) During a school-wide sniff-down, a trained dog registered possession on a 13-
year old girl. After she emptied her pockets to no avail, school administrators ordered a
strip search. Again no drugs were found, but later it was learned that the student had
been playing that morning with a dog in heat. In total, 2,780 innocent students were
subjected to a potentially frightening and obviously degrading investigative procedure.
Thirty-five students were wrongly suspected of possessing contraband. See Doe v. Ren-
frow, 631 F.2d at 95 (Fairchild, CJ., dissenting).
85. See also United States v. White, 766 F.2d 1328, 1331 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985) (distin-
guishing between tests that only establish the existence or non-existence of controlled
substances and investigative procedures with multiple variables).
86. "To the extent that a protected possessory interest was infringed, the infringe-
ment was de minimis and constitutionally reasonable." United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. at 126. The opinion left unclear whether this passage applied only to the minute
destruction of powder during the field test or to the entire process.
87. 466 U.S. at 133-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. 466 U.S. at 137-38. As an example, Justice Brennan suggested that under the
majority opinion, law enforcement officials could release trained cocaine-sensitive dogs
("canine cocaine connoisseurs") to roam the streets, sniffing at will. Cf People v. Evans,
65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 932, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436, 440 (1977). See also United States v.
Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977) (arguing that bomb sniff tests do not trigger
any constitutional safeguards).
89. 466 U.S. at 139-40. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982)
("[the] Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that
conceals its contents from plain view"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977)
("[n]o less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one who safe-
guards his possessions is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment").
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The reasoning of Jacobsen and Place potentially applies to urinal-
ysis drug testing.9 0 Ignoring the accuracy problems of narcotic de-
tection programs, 9' such testing arguably reveals only the presence
or absence of drug use and consequently falls outside the definition
of a search constructed by theJacobsen majority.9 2 While such a find-
ing may end the constitutional argument before it is even started,
the answer is really not so simple. Two points confirm this. First, as
Justice Brennan asserts, the fourth amendment establishes a funda-
mental protective layer which cannot be breached without invoking
the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights.9 3 Inherent in the
fourth amendment is the right to be left alone, to ward off the pry-
ing eyes of the state. Accurate and confidential drug testing is less
intrusive than more traditional forms of search and seizure, but that
intrusion nonetheless betrays legitimate individual and social expec-
tations of privacy.9 4 Second, even assuming that the state action
does not transgress social notions of legitimate privacy, the govern-
90. It is not quite clear whether the standard urinalysis fits the Jacobsen model. In
* particular, the accuracy of urinalysis programs and the Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay
Technique (EMIT) - the most popular form of testing - has been questioned. Data
suggest that the EMIT test, instead of revealing the presence or absence of drug use,
often inadvertently produces false positives, passive use errors, and inaccurate results
due to non-controlled medications and even medical impairments such as epilepsy. See
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-06 (D.D.C. 1986); McDonell v. Hunter,
612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (arguing that drug tests might yield a wealth
of private information; in the court's view, this type of 'hope' search - frequently em-
ployed by King George III - inspired the fourth amendment). See also Divoli and
Greenblatt, The Admissibility of Positive EMIT Results as Scientific Evidence: Counting Facts, Not
Heads, 5 J. OF CLINICAL PYSCHOPHARMACOLOGY 114-16 (1985) (attacking the courtroom
use of the EMIT test). But see Cohen, supra note 59, at 4-8 (1984) (defending the value
and accuracy of confirmed urinalysis testing). Since no technology is 100% accurate,
courts might conclude that confirmed drug tests fit the Place investigative mold.
91. Clearly, if government testing reveals information beyond mere drug use, then
the fourth amendment is legally invoked. One should question a procedure that can
only be constitutionally suspect after all the data accumulates.
92. But see Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029, 1035-37 (D.
Alaska 1986). In deciding that a breath sample constituted a cognizable search, the Bur-
nett court chose to rely on the language of Schmerber instead of the more recent decision
in Jacobsen.
93. The gradual erosion of the zone test does not obviate this point. While the pro-
visions of the fourth amendment are now more properly invoked by flexible notions of
social privacy rights rather than by textual distinctions, the ultimate constitutional pro-
tections are no less fundamental than they were before Katz. See supra § II.
94. For an exposition of privacy as a fundamental element of liberty, see Fried, Pri-
vacV, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968). To Fried, "privacy is not simply an absence of informa-
tion about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information
about ourselves." Id. at 482. Monitoring alters relationships in a subtle way, but it still
strips away from an individual control over his or her environment. Id. at 491. Charles
Fried is now Solicitor General of the United States and is likely to be arguing the con-
trary if the drug testing issue reaches the Supreme Court.
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ment compulsion disturbs the flow of daily life.9 5 While the humili-
ation and degradation of providing urine samples is both debatable
and variable, disagreement over this cannot alter the fact that sover-
eign authority has, by requiring drug tests, interfered with the ac-
tions of the innocent as well as the guilty, with the abstainers as well
as the abusers. 96 To permit such state action to proceed without
any judgment of the relative value of the procedure and the weight
of the intrusion vitiates the intent of the fourth amendment to limit
the authority of the government to disrupt the personal lives of the
citizenry.
B. The Puzzle of Consent
Pre-employment consent to drug testing presents another un-
resolved legal issue. 97 While the novelty of agency testing leaves
this argument still largely undebated, over the next few years gov-
ernment agencies will no doubt predicate their right to conduct
drug testing programs on pre-employment contractual waivers of
fourth amendment privacy rights.
Fourth amendment privacy rights may be waived under circum-
stances in which voluntary consent to a search or seizure is clear. 98
The voluntariness of the waiver must be measured under a "totality
of the circumstances" standard.99 The law on consent may influ-
95. This theory might bring drug urinalysis testing closer to a seizure than a search.
See generally Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). In fact, suspicionless drug testing is
distinguishable from the Jacobsen procedure on this basis. Government investigations
can raise fourth amendment issues on two levels: a seizure that brings the individual
into the government's grasp, and the subsequent search. United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 8 (1973). In Jacobsen, the search followed on the back of a private seizure. Thus,
this element of state action could not raise constitutional issues. The government com-
pulsion forcing drug testing would, however, create seizure issues. This reading ofJa-
cobsen would, of course, limit the case almost exclusively to its facts.
96. See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1229 (1983). Loewy agrees with the Jacobsen majority that the fourth amendment
should only protect innocent people but suggests that searches like drug testing tend to
reel in the innocent as well as the guilty. Id. at 1246-47.
97. But see Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 505
N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (App. Div. 1986) (predicating the entire discussion on the absence of
any contractual consent).
98. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
99. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49. In Schneckloth, a divided court
wrestled with the question of whether consent to a fourth amendment search was gov-
erned by the 'knowing' and 'intelligent' standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1937). Contending that the search and seizure issue did not raise equivalent constitu-
tional concerns of fairness of trial, the majority indicated that "there is no likelihood of
unreliability or coercion present in a search-and-seizure case." Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. at 242, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965). Be-
cause consent searches originated in common and acceptable police practices, the strict
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ence drug testing in two ways: defining consent as a voluntary
waiver of rights and allowing implied consent as a fictional or statu-
tory declaration of waiver. While the theory of consent often stands
as an independent doctrinal analysis in fourth amendment cases, in
reality the two-tiered consent analysis simply tracks the bifurcated
analysis of Katz.
Consent cases focus on valid and voluntary waivers of constitu-
tional rights. The paradigmatic consent case, Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, involved a search of an automobile for contraband. Without
first warning the occupants of the car of their fourth amendment
right of refusal, the police sought permission to search the interior
of the automobile. After the driver acquiesced,' 00 the police discov-
ered stolen checks in the trunk.' 0 ' Although the majority opinion
suggested that the consent issue required analysis outside the Katz
paradigm, the theory of consent actually fits neatly into a general
fourth amendment analysis. By definition, the person who waives a
certain right and consents to a search no longer retains a subjective
expectation of privacy. Thus, consent searches may be conducted
pursuant to the first element of the Katz standard.
The theory of implied consent, however, is more likely to be in-
voked in support of a government drug testing program. This
theory has roots in the companion cases of Zap v. United States 10 2 and
Davis v. United States. 103 In Zap, a businessman, contracting to per-
form experimental work with the Navy, signed a form permitting
random search of records and returns by the federal government.
In 1942, FBI agents audited the books over Zap's heated protests;
eventually, the search revealed a fraudulent check. The Court held
standard of waiver afforded to criminal defendants need not extend to the fourth
amendment. In dissent, Justice Brennan decried a practice permitting the waiver of
"something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without [the accused] ever being
aware of its existence." Schneckloth at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. The reply in this case was the relatively unambiguous "Sure, go ahead."
Schneckloth at 220. Consent cases often revolve around the actual language of the alleged
waiver. Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Since large-scale
government programs are unlikely to be based upon immediate express permission,
drug testing cases probably will not raise these consent issues. However, if this type of
conversation between employer and employee occurs, Schneckloth makes clear that the
government agency does not carry the burden of warning employees of their constitu-
tional rights. But cf. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that threat of disciplinary action on the part of the government
vitiated the validity of signed consent forms). See also McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp.
1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
102. 328 U.S. 624 (1946).




that Zap voluntarily consented to the search. 104 The facts of Davis
run parallel. Davis served as president of a corporation operating a
gasoline filling station; the company was suspected of black market-
ing gasoline during the reign of government rationing. After under-
cover agents purchased petroleum from Davis without the requisite
coupons, they demanded and gained - over Davis' protests - ac-
cess to the company's store of coupons. The agents claimed the
authority to search on the ground that the coupons legally remained
the property of the Office of Price Administration.10 5 Again, the
Court upheld the action on a voluntary waiver theory. Zap and Da-
vis, however, cannot rest on actual consent. Factual reconstruction
suggests that neither Zap nor Davis formed any lasting intent to
waive their fourth amendment rights, and that the searches thus
were not voluntary. However, in light of the rational relationship
between the business contract and the social acceptance of regula-
tory searches, the two cases can be seen as precursors of the modern
balancing test and as parents of the doctrine of implied consent.
The theory of implied consent does not require actual voluntary
acceptance. Instead, the doctrine - in the presence of contractual
or statutory waivers - entails weighing the competing interests me-
morialized in the document and the circumstances, and substituting
a social balancing test for the original negotiation of contract
rights.10 6 Since waivers of constitutional rights are generally disfa-
vored, pre-employment contract clauses, instead of settling any
legal dispute, merely set the stage for judicial interpretation of em-
ployer and employee welfare. The leading employment case in this
area is Picketing v. Board of Education.10 7 Pickering involved a school
teacher's purported waiver of first amendment rights as a precondi-
tion to employment. After publication of his letter attacking the
School Board's handling of a bond referendum, Pickering was dis-
104. "[W]hen petitioner, in order to obtain the Government's business, specifically
agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such
claim to privacy which he otherwise might have had as respects business documents
related to those contracts." Zap, 328 U.S. at 628.
105. Davis, 328 U.S. at 586.
106. Another aspect of implied consent theory emanates from statutory waivers. See
Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 634 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Alaska 1986) (upholding
waiver of right to refuse breathalyzer test for all state drivers). In such cases, however,
the validity of the statutory waiver turns upon competing individual and social interests.
See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (suggesting that the
government, even in defining a property right, may not unreasonably deprive an em-
ployee of certain inherent constitutional privileges).
107. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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missed for actions impugning the reputation of the Board. 08
Weighing the individual interest in free speech and the School
Board's natural desire for employee discipline, the Court concluded
that the personal interest in free speech outweighed the competing
state interests. 09 The Supreme Court's analysis of implied consent
devolved into a mere test of reasonableness. 10 Applied to fourth
amendment jurisprudence, the Pickering standard permits contrac-
tual waiver if the search is, under the circumstances, reasonable." I
Of course, this merely restates the basic search and seizure balanc-
ing test. Consequently, it would appear that pre-employment con-
tractual consent adds little to the government's defense of random
employee drug testing.112
VI. The Federal Testing Program: The Nexus Applied
The constitutional restrictions imposed by the fourth amendment
create substantial legal difficulties for existing government pro-
grams; despite Justice Department protestations to the contrary, the
recently unveiled federal plan should soon flounder against both
legal and social policy attacks.
On September 15, 1986, President Reagan issued an executive
order instituting a federal drug testing program permitting non-
108. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that accept-
ance of the job obligated Pickering to refrain from protected -peech. Pickering v. Board
of Educ. Township High School Dist. 205, 36 Ill.2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
109. Cf First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Donovan, 692 F.2d 714, 720 (11th
Cir. 1982) (permitting contractual consent to Department of Labor compliance reviews
but only to those reviews deemed reasonable under the fourth amendment). See also
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. at 1130. While first amendment and sixth amend-
ment rights may be more closely protected against unreasonable waiver, the little ex-
isting law on implied consent to searches more or less adheres to existing case law on
waiver.
110. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) ("[T]he theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any condi-
tions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected").
111. In this sense, the Pickering test reflects the theory of administrative search law.
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (upholding routinized inspections
for housing code violations). See also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (authoriz-
ing non-cause searches of mine operations); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972) (permitting inspections of firearms dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (accepting random searches of liquor licensees); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (authorizing fire inspections of warehouses). Compare Mar-
shall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (rejecting OSHA searches of almost all regu-
lated workplaces). These cases suggest that regulatory searches are acceptable only
where the intrusion is socially justifiable. The objective notion of waiver plays only a
minor role in the balancing tests.
112. On the other hand, pre-employment waiver adds to notice to employees and
reduces subjective expectations of privacy. The social judgment of the relative merits of
individual and public interest would, however, seem unaltered.
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cause urinalysis for all employees occupying 'sensitive' positions.' 13
Contending that drug use on and off the job poses serious hazards
to both federal employees and the general public, the President au-
thorized a program designed to eliminate drug abuse in the federal
workplace.' 14 On one level, the new Administration project is an
admirable step forward from previous government testing pro-
grams. The program states procedural and notice requirements
strictly; sixty-day fair warning, production of collateral medical doc-
umentation, and specific procedures for confidential and private re-
testing are all guaranteed." 5 Several flaws, however, undermine the
President's program. Despite the procedural safeguards designed
to minimize the subjective expectation of privacy, the program is
unconstitutional.
In the first place, the program fails to form the requisite link be-
tween testing and public goals. The project tests personnel in "sen-
sitive" positions, leaving a definitional void for reviewing courts.
No attempt is made to explain how drug use by these employees -
on or off the job - adversely affects the functioning of the govern-
ment. Presumably, the White House fears the loss or dissemination
of secret information, surely a legitimate social concern. Any evi-
dence, however, that drug use is correlated with leaks or subversion
is entirely lacking."i 6 Neither scientific nor intuitive analyses link
drug use with severe dysfunction among federal employees holding
sensitive positions.
113. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 C.F.R. 32889 (1986). Recent Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) regulations more fully define the scope of testing. The pool of
employees extends to all presidential appointees, law enforcement officials, and employ-
ees with access to classified information. Approximately 2.2 million workers fall into this
last category. The regulations require agency heads to outline their own programs
within these employee groups. See Havemann, U.S. Drug War Allows First-Offense Firing,
Washington Post, Nov. 28, 1986, at Al, col. 1. Recent federal court decisions have al-
ready placed the program in legal jeopardy. See National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, Civ. 86-3522 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(striking down the Customs Service's testing procedures).
114. The program also makes vague references to voluntary procedures for non-
sensitive positions. While it is not entirely clear from the order what form testing might
take, this formula falls under the aegis of consent, discussed supra in § V(b).
115. However, the executive order makes express provisions for visual supervision
of urination in instances where the "agency has reason to believe that a particular indi-
vidual may alter or substitute the specimen to be provided." Exec. Order No. 12,564,
supra note 113, at 32891. It is not clear, however, what level of reason is required under
these conditions.
116. An empirical showing that drug users are likely to talk with suspicious-looking
Russians or even more suspicious New York Times reporters might begin a rational justifi-
cation of the program. This showing seems unlikely given the presently known propen-
sities of narcotics abusers.
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In addition, even if this linkage between drug testing and public
safety exists, no actual problem justifies the abrogation of constitu-
tional rights. The executive order contains no evidence indicating
that drug abuse has actually endangered public safety; no claim
emerged that self-policing, self-educational programs, or other non-
intrusive alternatives to drug testing have proved inadequate. Such
omissions suggest that the Reagan program functions as a mecha-
nism to enforce social policy at the expense of government employ-
ees' rights.
Third, even if drug testing is implemented over these objections,
the Civil Service Reform Act bars the government from taking sig-
nificant action against an employee on the sole basis of drug testing
evidence.' 17 The federal judiciary has adopted a relational test that
forces the government to prove that arguably off-duty activity in-
fringes upon the rights of the employer." 18 As the courts have gen-
erally not viewed urinalysis results as probative ofjob impairment, a
mere positive test result would not justify dismissal."l 9 Conse-
quently, since action against personnel is effectively precluded, the
117. The Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982), provides that "an
individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended without pay only for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Despite the continued vitality
of the Civil Service Reform Act, the present Administration has indicated its intention to
fire some employees on a first-offense basis. See Havemann, supra note 113, at A1, col. 1.
118. See, e.g., Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
government failed to prove that an off-duty conviction for possession of controlled sub-
stances impaired the efficiency of the Civil Service). See also D.E. v. Department of the
Navy, 721 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1983); Gloster v. General Services Admin., 720 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Bonet v. United States Postal Serv. (Bonet I), 661 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.
1981). But see Hayes v. Department of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See
generally Comment,Judicial Review of Dismissals of Civil Service Employeesfor Off-Duty Miscon-
duct: The Approach of the Federal Circuit, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 439, 449 (1985). Recognizing
this problem, the Administration has submitted legislation to alter the nexus test of the
Civil Services Reform Act.
119. The federal courts have generally rejected the contention that the employment
context prevents recourse to constitutional norms. See generally Allen v. City of Marietta,
601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Cf NewJersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985);
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (contending that it would be "anomalous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior"). However, some courts have suggested
that the existence of an employment relationship creates a reduced social and individual
expectation of privacy. See Alinovi v. Worcester School Comm., 766 F.2d 660, 666-67
(1st Cir. 1985), modified, 777 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231
(1986); United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1123 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966). Compare
Ortega v. O'Conner, 764 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted in part, 106 S. Ct. 565
(1986) (finding an employee search unreasonable due to procedural errors and the ab-
sence of an employment nexus).
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invasion of privacy rights engendered by government drug testing
can reward the public with only marginal safety gains.
VII. Conclusion
The framers of the fourth amendment never envisioned many of
the exigencies of modern society. Balancing tests have proven nec-
essary and effective in adapting original doctrine to current social
and individual interests. The peculiar difficulties posed by em-
ployee drug testing suggest that such intrusions violate the reasona-
bleness test unless the government can clearly show several factors:
the existence of a present danger posed by employee drug use, the
inadequacy of self-help and self-policing, the construction of effec-
tive procedural and confidentiality safeguards, and the formulation
of a discrete group of employees who, because of the nature of their
job, interact with the public within the scope of a fundamentally
dangerous occupation.
This article leaves open the question of what jobs might fit this
description, but the implications of the analysis should be clear.
Even if the burdensome evidentiary barrier established by a present
danger standard is overcome, few government employees' activities
pose a substantial hazard to social safety. Historically, government
workers have served as lightning rods for new waves of societal con-
cern. At present, a sense of urgency over drug abuse pervades this
country. It is a serious problem, long exacerbated by government
neglect. But this new war on drugs should not be turned into mari-
juana McCarthyism. There is a time and a place for prosecution of
abusers of narcotics. The government workshop is not that place.
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